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Abstract
Brexit will offi cially fall on 29 March 2019 at midnight, Brussels time, 
and will undoubtedly represents a milestone in the history of European 
integration: after long years of deepening and enlarging, this is the fi rst 
time a sovereign member state will leave the EU. This article is a humble 
effort to provide an overview of Brexit, by identifying the interests and 
red lines of the EU and the UK, as well as pointing to the key elements 
of negotiations, as they are known at the time of writing, the end of May 
2018. For the research primary and secondary sources have been analysed, 
and historical methodology has been combined with the critical analysis 
method to understand the background of the process and point to its main 
stumbling blocks. The paper concludes that despite apparent rigidities 
and deadlocks, mutual trust and goodwill, as well as time constraint and 
practical considerations, may help overcome divides and fi nd technically 
workable solutions.
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Introduction
Although the referendum on the United Kingdom’s EU membership, 
which took place on 23rd June 2016, had only advisory status (i.e. not le-
gally binding), its result is taken most seriously by the main political par-
ties of the UK. They do so not only because there was a clear difference 
(both percentage-wise and in absolute terms) between Leave and Remain 
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voters, but also for the considerable support within the electorate for the 
UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (see: Table 1). 
Table 1. Comparison of referendums concerning real support for winners
Votes 
(absolute 
numbers)
Percentage
A/B
(victory)
Percentage
A/C
(real sup-
port)
United Kingdom 
EU membership 
(Brexit) Referen-
dum (2016)
A “Leave” votes 17 410 742 51.9% 37.4%
B Valid votes 33 551 983
C Registered voters 46 500 001
Norwegian EU 
membership ref-
erendum (1994)
A “No” votes 1 516 803 52.2% 46.4%
B Valid votes 2 906 750
C Registered voters 3 266 064
French presi-
dential election 
(2017) fi rst round
A Votes for Macron 8 656 346 24.0% 18.2%
B Valid votes 36 054 394
C Registered voters 47 582 183
French legislative 
election (2017) 
fi rst round
A REM + MoDem 7 323 496 32.2% 15.4%
B Valid votes 22 654 164
C Registered voters 47 570 988
French legislative 
election (2017) 
second round
A REM + MoDem 8 926 901 49.1% 18.9 %
B Valid votes 18 176 066
C Registered voters 47 293 103
Source: Statistics Norway; The Electoral Commission; French Government.
Even if the “Leave” side received somewhat weaker support than the 
“No” side had had in a similar vote on EU membership in Norway – held 
more than 20 years earlier and enjoying an extremely high turnout (89%) 
– it received much stronger support than for example Emmanuel Macron 
did in the fi rst round of the presidential election or his presidential major-
ity (his party, the REM1 and the party of his partners, named MoDem2) 
did in either round of the legislative election, all held in France in 2017. 
Therefore, the robust support behind Brexit makes a second vote highly 
unlikely, at least in the short run, in the same manner as the opportunity 
1  La République En Marche is the ruling political party in France, sometimes 
called by its old name En Marche (EM), matching the initials of its own founder, 
Emmanuel Macron.
2  Le Mouvement Démocrate secured an agreement with REM in the 2017 legis-
lative election after his founder and leader (François Bayrou) endorsed the candidacy 
of Macron to be president of France a couple of months earlier.
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for Scotland to keep her membership in the European Union if Britain 
leaves.3
Speculations about the future started well before the referendum, and 
the momentum continues to this day. Most papers concentrate on Brit-
ain’s economy without knowing anything about the nature of the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK, and most of them predict lower 
growth due to Brexit. There are, however, a few think tanks (e.g. Econo-
mists for Free Trade) expecting GDP to be higher in 15 years than if the 
country remained in the EU. They assert that escaping from the EU would 
boost economic growth and raise living standards across Britain, especial-
ly for the poorest.4 Many fewer papers deal with the EU’s future,5 and 
even fewer try to propose a new form of cooperation – as Pisani-Ferry et 
al.6 do so, suggesting a so-called continental partnership – which could 
also serve as a model for Europe’s relations with other partners like the 
EEA countries,7 Switzerland, Turkey or Ukraine.8
By departing from the facts and, more generally, from what can be 
known about the Brexit process this late May 2018, this article fi rst gives 
a short overview of the main interests and red lines for both of the nego-
3  As there are worries in more than one EU member state (e.g. in France or 
Spain) about secessionist trends, it is unlikely that any of them would encourage or 
agree to the precedent of swift accession of a successor state to the EU in case the 
United Kingdom disintegrates.
4  R. Bootle, J. Jessop, G. Lyons, P. Minford, Alternative Brexit Economic Analysis, 
2018, p. 16, https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/publication/ (21.05.2018).
5  For example, some deal with the agri-food sector, to which Brexit may cause 
harm in two ways: through limiting the budget available for the CAP (common ag-
ricultural policy) – with reductions amounting up to EUR 1 billion a year e.g. for 
Poland – and through a deterioration in terms of mutual trade, with a potential break-
down of the Polish exports of agri-food products to the UK (K. Kosior, Ł. Ambro-
ziak, Brexit-Potential Implications for the Polish Food Sector, in: The Common Agricultural 
Policy of the European Union-the present and the future. EU Member States point of view, 
eds. M. Wigier, A. Kowalski, Warsaw 2018, p. 159).
6  J. Pisani-Ferry, N. Röttgen, A. Sapir, P. Tucker, G.B. Wolff, Europe after Brexit: 
A proposal for a continental partnership, vol. 25, Brussels, Bruegel 2016, https://ces.fas.
harvard.edu/uploads/fi les/Reports-Articles/Europe-after-Brexit.pdf (23.05.2018).
7  Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein.
8  The proposed continental partnership (CP) would be less deep than EU mem-
bership but mean a clearly closer relationship than a free trade agreement. The UK 
would fully participate in goods, services and capital mobility, some temporary labour 
mobility, also in a new CP system of inter-governmental decision making and en-
forcement – while the ultimate formal authority would remain with the EU. The UK 
would continue to contribute to the common budget and co-operate with the EU-27 
on such issues as foreign policy, security and possibly defence (J. Pisani-Ferry, N. Röt-
tgen, A. Sapir, P. Tucker, G.B. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 1, 3, 6).
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tiating parties (i.e. the European Commission and the UK Government), 
and then explores the key elements of the negotiations, focusing on the 
main stumbling blocks in the way of achieving an orderly withdrawal of 
the UK from the European Union.
Interests & Red Lines
Let us fi rst go through the main confl icts of interest which may arise in 
the context of Brexit. There is one between labour and capital, although 
they obviously have common interests too, such as the success of the en-
terprises. Businesses are basically interested in keeping costs at the lowest 
possible level. For them, it has been a blessing to have all these people 
arriving fi rst from the Commonwealth countries, then from Eastern and 
Southern Europe, willing to work for less than natives. Not that immi-
grant workers are more effi cient or frugal than natives, but for most of 
them, to work in the UK means a relatively short period, whereas for na-
tives it is a whole life long. Immigrants only come and live to work. They 
work hard, do not participate in strikes, try to gain and save as much as 
they can, and send a fair portion of their salary back home. With Brexit 
and a regulated immigration policy, pay levels will certainly have to in-
crease, which is in the interest of native workers.9
There is another confl ict of interest between the enterprises accord-
ing to their size. Big businesses are likely to be involved in international 
trade; for them the free access to the European single market is of utmost 
importance. But there are a myriad of micro, small and medium-sized 
businesses in the United Kingdom – most of them without any major in-
9  Interestingly enough, part of the problem has recently been resolved. During 
the run-up to the referendum, Brexit campaigners argued that free movement was 
undermining British workers in e.g. construction and food processing, with some 
fi rms importing cheap workers from Poland and Romania. In case of ‘posted work-
ers’, despite obligations for employers to pay these workers the minimum wage of 
the importing country, legal loopholes allowed undercutting the local workforce, e.g. 
by deducting from wages travel and accommodation expenses. Finally, in May 2018 
– and not independently from what could be learnt from the lessons of the Brexit 
campaign – the EU has addressed the issue. In future, employers of ‘posted workers’ 
will be obliged to offer equal pay, the same allowances, and reimbursement for travel 
and accommodation costs as soon as from the start of the posting. J. Kirton-Darling, 
A. Jongerius, The EU has just passed a law that could end the problems with free move-
ment which led to Brexit in the fi rst place, “Independent”, 30 May 2018, https://www.
independent.co.uk/voices/eu-brexit-uk-labour-laws-migrant-workers-a8375836.html 
(2.08.2018); BBC, EU tightens law on foreign temporary workers. BBC News 29 May 
2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44293265 (2.08.2018).
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ternational relationships – that employ more people than the big ones.10 
Despite having relatively weak international embeddedness, SMEs still 
must observe EU standards. For them, complying with regulation is 
more expensive than for larger fi rms. This is so not only because they 
have to spread their costs – in most cases consisting of fi xed components 
which are the same for large and small fi rms – against lower turnover, 
but also because they are generally price takers and fi nd it diffi cult to 
pass the incurred costs onto their customers.11 For SMEs, there would 
certainly be some benefi t from Brexit by getting rid of most of these 
regulations. 
A third type of confl ict of interest exists between the UK Parliament 
and the devolved administrations (those of Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland). The current devolution settlements were created in the context 
of the country’s EU membership. Consequently, the devolved legislatures 
only have legislative competence in the devolved areas – such as agricul-
ture and fi sheries, environment and some transport issues – as long as 
the rules created by them are compatible with EU law.12 So, even though 
they have been devolved, the responsibility for these policy arias has in 
practice been excised largely at EU level for the last couple of decades. 
The point is that upon Brexit whereby certain competences will be repat-
riated from the EU, if there are no changes to the devolution settlements, 
responsibility will fall automatically to the devolved jurisdictions. This 
could potentially lead to regulatory divergence, and thus – by altering 
the competitive neutrality – could undermine the integrity of the UK’s 
10  According to data from 2016, 99.9% of UK private companies belong to the 
small and medium-sized (SMEs) category. They together account for 47% of all pri-
vate sector turnover (GBP 1,800 billion) and 60% of jobs (15.7 million people) [UK 
Small Business Statistics – Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions in 2016, 
The Federation of Small Businesses, https://www.fsb.org.uk/media-centre/small-
business-statistics (30.05.2018)]. While there are plenty of reasons behind the Brexit, 
one cannot exclude that the special attention which has, for decades, been paid to big 
companies, and the fact that economic policy, laws and regulations have been tailored 
for them, were also playing a role. Meanwhile, a growing proportion of smaller com-
panies feel completely let down by the incumbent government.
11  EU regulatory cost to business in Britain was estimated at EUR 99.89 billion 
for the period of 1998-2008, i.e. a yearly EUR 9.1 billion. T. Ambler, F. Chittenden, 
A. Bashir, Counting the Cost of EU Regulation to Business, Brussels 2009, p. 19; F. Chit-
tenden, T. Ambler, A question of perspective: Impact Assessment and the perceived costs and 
benefi ts of new regulations for SMEs, “Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy”, no. 33(1)/2015, pp. 9–24.
12  UK Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the 
European Union (White Paper), February 2017, HM Government CM9417.
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internal market.13 On the other side, of course, also the British govern-
ment has a huge responsibility not to take advantage of the situation of 
having the authority to deal with international relations, including nego-
tiations with the EU, and – on the pretext of “technical constraints,” e.g. 
maintaining common standards and ensuring stability and certainty for 
business – re-centralize too much decision-making power to Westminster. 
The impact of Brexit on UK’s devolution settlements is incontestably one 
of the most (technically) complex (and politically sensitive) elements of 
the whole withdrawal process.14
Finally, there are confl icting interests between the UK and the EU-27. 
Normally, there should not be any major problems, as they are supposed to 
serve the interests of the people they represent. Therefore, they should focus 
on protecting jobs and businesses, which could be best achieved by main-
taining the closest possible economic relationship with each other. Appar-
ently, this is only the goal of the UK,15 while the EU – fearing that a Brexit 
not deterrent enough to stop other member states from reconsidering their 
own situation could lead to total disintegration – is adamant the UK cannot 
maintain as good a relationship with the EU-27 as it has as a member.16
With this, we have arrived to the question of red lines. The EU-27’s 
most important red line for Brexit is related to the dogma17 of the indi-
13  UK Parliament, Brexit: devolution. European Union Committee, 4th Report of 
Session 2017-19 – published 19 July 2017, HL (House of Lords) Paper 9.
14  As England’s fellow-nations usually have a greater share of EU’s agricultural 
funds than their share in UK’s population, it would be a most critical step towards 
creating a climate of trust if the existing population-based method of allocation of 
funding to the devolved (the so-called ‘Barnett formula’) were replaced with a more 
appropriate needs-based funding arrangement. Only in such a way could the devolved 
be compensated for the loss of EU funding, caused by Brexit in the long-term. [Under 
the Barnett Formula, devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
receive a population-based proportion of changes in planned UK government spend-
ing on comparable services, either in England, or in England and Wales together, or 
in Great Britain, as it is appropriate. House of Commons Library, The Barnett formula: 
a quick guide, June 27, 2017 https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/parliament-and-
elections/devolution/the-barnett-formula-a-quick-guide/ (1.05.2018).
15  As it is stated in the Brexit White Paper “The Government will prioritise securing 
the freest and most frictionless trade possible in goods and services between the UK and the 
EU…” (UK Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new…, op. cit.).
16  „A non-member of the Union … cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same 
benefi ts as a member”. Consilium, European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit ne-
gotiations, 29 April 2017, p. 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21763/29-euco-
art50-guidelinesen.pdf (25.02.2018).
17  The four freedoms can be each other’s substitutes – e.g. free movement of goods 
and persons, as the quantity of work embodied in imports have circa the same effect 
on local wages than when those products are produced by immigrant workers [W. 
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visibility of the four freedoms, which sums up in the notorious notion of 
“no cherry picking”.18 In the British government’s opinion, every trade 
arrangement is cherry-picking in the sense that it contains varying mar-
ket access depending on the respective interests of the countries involved. 
The EU itself is taking a tailored approach, for example, to the fi sheries 
sector in relation to which “the Commission has been clear that no prec-
edents exist for the sort of access it wants from the UK” (May 2018).19 As 
for the UK’s red lines, they arise from the desire of gaining back control 
over laws (ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice), bor-
ders (ending free immigration of workers from the EU), money (ending 
excessive net contribution to the common budget), and trade (being able 
to conduct a fully independent external trade policy, and forge agreements 
with non-EU countries).
Kohler, G. Müller, Brexit, the four freedoms and the indivisibility dogma, LSE Brexit, 
2017, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86187/1/brexit-2017-11-27-brexit-the-four-freedoms-
and-the-indivisibility.pdf (23.02.2018)]. The notion of ‘four freedoms’ does not ap-
pear in the Treaties, but the promotion of free movement of persons, capital, goods 
and services is already mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (Article 3) as the very essence 
of the integration. So, the logic of the four freedoms is not based on economic but 
political reasoning [W. Münchau, Europe’s four freedoms are its very essence, “Financial 
Times”, November 12, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/49dc02dc-c637-11e7-a1d2-
6786f39ef675 (28.12.2017)]. As a matter of fact, after more than 25 years since Maas-
tricht, those four freedoms (particularly the one of services) are not yet fully achieved. 
In the relationship of the EU with Switzerland, there is free movement of people 
(to a very high degree), but there is no freedom of services as banks cannot provide 
services to each other’s customers. Is it sacrilege to ask for the opposite, like Britons 
do, seeking freedom of services but controlled labour infl ow? P. Carrel, Indivisible or 
fl exible? Brexit battle looms over EU freedoms, Reuters, November 7, 2016, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-freedoms-analysis/indivisible-or-fl exible-brexit-
battle-looms-over-eu-freedoms-idUSKBN1320MS?il=0 (25.05.2018).
18  “… the four freedoms of the Single Market are indivisible and … there can be 
no ‘cherry picking’.” Consilium, European Council (Art. 50)…, op. cit., p. 3.
19  It is to be noted here that, in 2015, EU vessels caught more than 6 times more 
in tonnage and 4 times more in value in UK waters than UK vessels caught in EU-27 
waters [UK Government, Government response to House of Lords EU Energy and Envi-
ronment Sub-Committee Report into the future of fi sheries in the light of the vote to leave the 
EU, 2017, p. 1, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-en-
ergy-environment-subcommittee/Brexit-fisheries/Gvt-Response.pdf (1.06.2018) 
What makes this issue more complex is that the evolution of the fi shing industry led 
to specialisation, so that EU countries fi sh for different species in each other’s waters. 
As, from fi shing gears to processing factories, it would take decades to reverse this 
process, it seems unlikely the UK could reasonably deny access to its waters to the 
EU-27 even if its plan for a non-painful withdrawal from the EU were to fail. House 
of Lords, Brexit: fi sheries. European Union Committee 8th Report of Session 2016-17, 
17 December 2016, HL Paper 78, pp. 38–39.
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There is an issue, concerning the land border between Northern Ire-
land and the Republic of Ireland – which is very important for both nego-
tiating parties in that they have repeatedly expressed their commitment 
to supporting and upholding the Peace Process and the Belfast (or Good 
Friday) Agreement, and particularly avoiding a hard border with a physi-
cal infrastructure or any related checks and controls – in relation to which 
there are red lines on both sides. The essence of these red lines is that any 
solutions at the Irish border will have to respect both the integrity of the 
Union legal order (EU-27’s red line20), and the constitutional integrity of 
the United Kingdom.21
Key Elements of the Negotiations
Withdrawal negotiations between the EU and the UK formally started 
on 19th June 2017 and Brexit will offi cially fall at midnight, Brussels time, 
on 29th March 2019. This paper cannot cover the whole exit process – for 
an (almost) complete chronology, see Consilium online – but will focus 
instead on some key elements, stumbling blocks and milestones of the 
negotiations. One of the main stumbling blocks in the way of achieving 
an orderly withdrawal of the UK from the EU is related to the fact that 
the two most important treaties – one of which is vital to the one party, 
while the other is to the counterparty – cannot be completed simultane-
ously, but only in succession. This problem’s origins lie in the difference 
in the interpretation of Article 50.22 In the Commission’s understanding, 
fi rst the exit agreement should be concluded and only after the UK has 
become a third country to the EU will it be possible for the parties to fi -
nalise their deal on the framework of their future cooperation.23 
Although this so-called ‘phased approach’ has never been the British 
Government’s view – as, in their reading, it is not possible to have a prop-
20  European Council, European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations, 
2017, p. 6, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-
brexit-guidelines/ (29.05.2018).
21  The issue of the Irish border will be further discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter [the UK’s red line – D. Davis, The progress of the UK’s negotiations on EU with-
drawal. Exiting the European Union Committee, 25 April 2018, 10:03, https://www.
parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/08a8fed4-919d-4cb5-94ec-c9c0fecf60f0 (2.06.2018)].
22  Paragraph 2 of Article 50 says: “…the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union” (The Lisbon 
Treaty).
23  European Council, European Council (Art. 50)…, op. cit., p. 4.
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er withdrawal treaty negotiation unless they know where they are going24 
– London did not shy away from discussing the main issues in an order 
which corresponded to the EU guidelines.25 But the problem remains, 
and towards end 2018 or early 2019 – when the UK Parliament will have 
to vote on the exit deal – MPs will face two documents: 
– the withdrawal agreement, which will be a treaty setting out the 
terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, including the fi nan-
cial settlement,26 and once ratifi ed, having the force of international 
law, on the one hand; 
– and a mere political declaration, setting out the terms of the EU-UK fu-
ture partnership which will not be legally binding, on the other hand.
Even if both sides are interested in having the political declaration 
to be substantive enough – about e.g. the details of the future free trade 
agreement, mutual recognition of standards, or rules of origin – it will be 
diffi cult for the UK government to explain to MPs what the country will 
have got by the declaration.27
Certainty is important not only for MPs (before they vote), but also 
for businesses all over Europe. The single biggest risk to them posed by 
Brexit comes from the uncertainty about whether and to what extent they 
could retain access to each other’s markets. They need two pieces of infor-
mation: what the UK’s future relationship with the EU will look like, and 
what the bridge arrangement will be between leaving and getting to that 
relationship. In the absence of clarity, fi rms may pre-empt uncertainty by 
restructuring or relocating based on a worst-case scenario. In this respect, 
it was an important step towards clarity when, following the December 
2017 European Council decision28 to move to the second phase of Brexit 
24  I. Rogers, European Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence: EU-UK Relations 
in Preparation for Brexit. HC 791, Wednesday 1 February 2017, Witness: Sir Ivan 
Rogers KCMG, former Perm. Repr. to the EU, 10:27, http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/
Index/0d6145fa-5329-426d-8300-8eda8f215184 (27.05.2018).
25  Accordingly, the fi rst rounds of negotiation followed the agenda proposed by 
the Commission, dealing with the permeability of the UK’s land border with Ireland, 
the acquired rights of EU citizens in Britain and British citizens in EU-27, the disen-
tanglement of the UK from the EU budget and its fi nancial liabilities, and other sepa-
ration issues (like Euratom, goods placed on the market, on-going Union procedures, 
judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, and the relocation of EU bank-
ing and medicines agencies originally headquartered in the UK). Consilium, Brexit, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-uk-after-referendum/ (3.06.2018).
26  The exit bill, or the sum of money the UK will have to pay on leaving, is esti-
mated to be between £35 billion and £39 billion (D. Davis, op. cit., 10:06).
27  Ibidem.
28  The decision was based on the progress achieved in key areas of negotiations 
(i.e. citizens’ rights, Irish border, exit bill) and refl ected in the so-called Joint Report 
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negotiations, the issue of a transition period has appeared on the negotia-
tion agenda.
As it was in both parties’ interests, a settlement was quickly drawn 
up on transition and presented to the public as part of the Draft With-
drawal Agreement (DWA) of 19 March 2018, the so-called coloured ver-
sion29 which is the biggest milestone of the negotiations to date. During 
the transition period, lasting from Brexit day in March 2019 to the end of 
2020, almost nothing will change – e.g. the Britons remaining in both 
the single market and customs union, hence under the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Justice – but the UK will no longer take part 
in the decision-making of the EU institutions, save when invited to 
do so. Although, the UK obtained some concessions for the transition 
period – like the possibility to negotiate, sign and ratify international 
agreements with non-EU countries; being treated as a member state for 
the purposes of international agreements concluded by the EU; and ab-
staining from European foreign policy measures it would have vetoed as 
a member – it had to, in exchange, soften its position on fi sheries catch 
issues (by agreeing to delay the renegotiation of fi shing quotas until 
2020),30 and immigration (by postponing the specifi ed date – by which 
EU citizens can exercise their free movement rights – from Brexit day 
to the end of transition).31
(JR) of 8th December 2017. In JR, both parties agreed upon principles about how to 
protect rights of their citizens residing on each other’s territory, how to avoid a hard 
border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and how to calculate the value of the 
fi nancial settlement. As for the latter element, its essence is that the UK will partici-
pate in the common budget in 2019 and 2020 (so, matching the end of the current 
Multiannual Financial Framework) as if it remained in the EU. London has agreed 
to pay its share of EU’s outstanding liabilities incurred before end 2020, as well as of 
EU’s contingent liabilities as established at the date of withdrawal. The UK’s ‘share’ 
will be calculated based on the UK’s percentage share of member states’ total contri-
butions to the common budget in the period of 2014–2020. European Commission, 
Joint report from the negotiators of the EU and the UK Government on progress during 
phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the 
EU, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/fi les/joint_report.pdf 
(7.06.2018).
29  The rows of the DWA have been highlighted with different colours depending 
on whether there is agreement on the text (green), the policy objectives (yellow) or 
none of them (white).
30  The fact that they will have to wait until 2020 to assume full control over the 
British waters caused great disappointment in coastal fi shing communities which 
had massively voted for Brexit even in Scotland.
31  European Commission (2018). Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the UK from 
the EU (coloured version), 16–19 March 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/
beta-political/fi les/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf (8.06.2018).
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With the DWA, the negotiators have achieved signifi cant progress to-
wards fi nalising an exit treaty. Several chapters, like rules on the transi-
tion period, citizens’ rights or the fi nancial settlement are already com-
pletely, or almost completely agreed upon.32 Other issues, like some of 
the separation provisions (e.g. pending criminal and police proceedings, 
pending ECJ cases and administrative proceedings, and fi rst of all data 
protection33), general rules on dispute settlement and the most important 
element of Irish border issues (i.e. free movement of goods) are still wait-
ing to be resolved. As the latter problem seems to be the single largest risk 
factor to derailment of the Brexit negotiations (i.e. timely conclusion of 
the withdrawal agreement), it needs to be treated separately.
Customs controls were fi rst introduced at the land border between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland in 1923 and maintained until the establish-
ment of the European single market in 1992. During the ‘Troubles’ (eth-
no-nationalist confl ict in Northern Ireland lasting from 1969 to 1998), the 
border was manned by substantial military presence (including “watch-
towers”) and a number of roads were blocked by security forces. Today, 
this is an invisible and open border, as following the conclusion of the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998, all military security installa-
tions and other physical infrastructure were removed.34 Apart facilitating 
cross-border trade, the importance of this open border lies in that it is 
a symbol of the success of the peace process, and something supporting 
32 There are some exceptions. E.g. on voting rights (i.e. the right to vote in local 
elections) the UK still have to agree with member states bilaterally, while on onward 
movement (i.e. the ability to continue to move freely across the member states after 
Brexit) with the EU (D. Davis, op. cit., 9:43). As for the fi nancial settlement, a dilem-
ma still exists: the prospects of the UK being able to negotiate its future relationship 
with the EU without having to contribute signifi cantly to the common budget would 
imply a violation of the principle whereby poorer members have over average access 
to EU funds in exchange for opening up their markets to companies of the more de-
veloped. But, for the British, having to contribute to the EU budget as before would 
be the same as betraying one of the main tenets behind Brexit referendum: taking 
back control of their money.
33  “Both parties want the GDPR rulebook to apply in the UK without consider-
ing as yet an equivalent UK law to be applied in Europe. In a worst case scenario (if 
this problem is not resolved) “new clauses dealing with third country transfers would 
need to be added into every contract between an EU and UK entity where data is 
processed”. KPMG, Draft agreement on UK withdrawal from EU and transition, 2018, 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/ie/pdf/2018/03/ie-brexit-withdrawal-
agreement-eu.pdf (9.06.2018).
34  UK Government, Northern Ireland and Ireland – Position Paper 16 August 2017, 
p. 12, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/fi le/638135/6.3703_DEXEU_Northern_Ireland_and_Ireland_IN-
TERACTIVE.pdf (10.06.2018).
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the normalisation of relations between Protestant and Catholic communi-
ties in both Northern Ireland and across the border.35
Having all the above as well as the related sensitivities in mind, it is no 
wonder discussion about the Irish border issue seems extremely emotion-
al and exaggerated. First, control of people is not an issue here, as there is 
no need for immigration controls thanks to the historic CTA (Common 
Travel Area, an arrangement between the UK and Ireland relating to the 
movement of persons) recognised in EU law (Protocol 20, TFEU).36 So, 
the issue is primarily about the trade border.37
Second, since most of the necessary trading formalities are conducted 
electronically, 95 per cent of goods pass the border without any checks 
there. Only animals and animal products must, in theory, pass through 
specifi c entry points where veterinary checks can be done, which would 
be made redundant either by maintaining the current mutual recognition 
of accreditations and inspection regimes (which exists between member 
states), or agreeing on it in an FTA (free trade agreement).38
An ambitious and comprehensive (zero-tariff) FTA, incorporating 
a chapter on a highly streamlined customs arrangement (known as “max-
imum facilitation” or MaxFac), has always been option “A” for the UK 
government.39 There are many examples of how this sort of system could 
work, e.g. such as Authorised Economic Operator scheme or new form of 
electronic documentation. The technology (e.g. electronic/bar code tag-
35  T. Durrant, A. Stojanovic, The Irish border after Brexit, IfG Insight June 2018, 
p. 4, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/fi les/publications/irish-
border-after-brexit-fi nal.pdf (10.06.2018).
36  Instead of being ensured at the border, migration control can be performed via 
checks in workplaces, banks, universities and on landlords, as is currently done for 
non-EU citizens. S. Peers, The Day the Unicorns Cried: the deal on phase 1 of the Brexit 
talks, 2017, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-day-unicorns-cried-deal-
on-phase-1.html (10.06.2018)..
37  S. Singham, How to fi x the Irish border problem, 2018, https://capx.co/how-to-fi x-
the-irish-border-problem/ (11.06.2018).
38  Even in the absence of a full FTA, a bilateral border arrangement can be agreed 
based on the exception to the MFN (most-favoured-nation) principle (described in 
GATT XXIV/3) concerning frontier traffi c in a frontier zone of 10–15 km on each 
side of the border. K. Hydert, Exceptions in Favour of Frontier Traffi c, Customs Unions, 
Free Trade Areas and Discrimination, in: Equality of Treatment and Trade Discrimination 
in International Law, Dordrecht 1968, p. 98.
39  Option ’B’ would be the so-called new customs partnership whereby the UK 
would apply EU’s customs regime to imports from third countries destined for the 
EU market. As this option, mentioned in both the JR and the DWA, would require 
sophisticated tracking technology and/or a costly tariff repayment system, is now 
considered a non-starter. J. Jessop, The case for ‘MaxFac, 2018, https://iea.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/BU-Briefi ng-on-MaxFac-2.pdf (11.06.2018) 
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ging, number-plate recognition, secure smartphone apps, GPS tagging) 
for all aspects of monitoring this process remotely already exists for larger 
traders (and can certainly be developed for smaller local traders), but it 
would require close cooperation between the customs services of the two 
countries.40 
In the absence of agreed solutions, both the JR and the DWA fore-
sees a third option (option “C” or a “backstop agreement”) which would 
compel the UK (in respect of Northern Ireland) to maintain full align-
ment with EU’s internal market and customs union. But that scenario 
will be unlikely to come true.41 Especially, because the wording of the 
DWA (“The territory of Northern Ireland… shall be considered to be 
part of the customs territory of the Union”), would be unacceptable for 
any UK government – as it would effectively start a process of breaking 
up the United Kingdom.42 
Many argue that the best solution would be option “A”.43 At the other 
extreme, remaining in some form of customs union, or – having in mind the 
relatively limited economic signifi cance of the Irish border44 – seeing its en-
tire customs arrangements constrained by the supposed needs of this border, 
would prevent the UK from achieving regulatory autonomy and pursuing 
an independent trade policy.45 Although MaxFac would not eliminate trade 
frictions completely, and even some additional customs costs and some oth-
ers, related to rules of origin, would be incurred, gains coming from trade 
liberalisation (i.e. the ability to lower barrier to trade with third countries and 
reduce market distortions at home) would exceed the costs.46
Conclusion
Brexit negotiations seem to be proceeding at a slower pace recently, 
as talks are more and more concentrated on the hottest issues. Although 
40  S. Singham, op. cit.
41  “It is currently diffi cult to see how the ‘fall-back’ option will work in practice” 
(KPMG, Draft agreement on UK…, op. cit.).
42  D. Davis, op. cit., 10:03.
43  Even the European Council confi rmed its readiness to work towards an ambi-
tious and wide-ranging FTA; European Council, EU Council (Art. 50) guidelines on the 
framework for the future EU-UK relationship, 23 March 2018, p. 3, http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/media/33458/23-euco-art50-guidelines.pdf (12.06.2018).
44  For both Northern Ireland’s and Ireland’s economies, intra-Irish trade is mar-
ginal compared to sales going to mainland Great Britain. S. Singham, op. cit.
45  D. Blake, How bright are the prospects for UK trade and prosperity post-Brexit?, 
London 2018, p. 56.
46  J. Jessop, op. cit.
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most of the remaining problems can only be solved by ditching some of 
the EU’s or UK’s redlines, it seems, from a neutral observer’s perspec-
tive, to be quite possible to fi nd technically workable solutions. Obviously, 
this would require mutual trust and goodwill, and that negotiating parties 
cease to stick to their perceived political interests. As for the latter, let 
us hope that time constraints and practical considerations will help over-
come them. Let us fi nish with a recent evidence given by DExEU minister 
David Davis before a parliamentary select committee: “[…] in all of this 
negotiation… when we get into the detail and work through detail it tends 
to unblock things rather than block things […]”.47 
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